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Social Norms and Information Diffusion in Water-saving Programs: 
Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Colombia 
Mónica Marcela Jaime Torres and Fredrik Carlsson∗ 
Abstract 
This paper investigates direct and spillover effects of a social information campaign 
aimed at encouraging residential water savings in Colombia. The campaign was organized as a 
randomized field experiment, consisting of monthly delivery of consumption reports, including 
normative messages, for one year. Results indicate that social information and appeals to norm-
based behavior reduce water use by up to 6.8% in households directly targeted by the campaign. 
In addition, we find evidence of spillover effects: households that were not targeted by the 
campaign reduced water use by 5.8% in the first six months following the intervention. 
Nevertheless, neither direct nor spillover effects can be attributed to social networks for any of 
our chosen proxies of social and geographic proximity. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, there has been a growing trend of employing social information, i.e., 
information about others’ behavior, to influence individuals’ own decisions. The basic idea is 
that individuals will conform to the behavior of others, for example, through social norms. As 
Lindbeck (1997) points out, both economic incentives and social norms give rise to purposeful or 
rational behavior: while economic incentives imply material rewards, social norms imply social 
rewards.1 A series of randomized field experiments aiming at water and energy conservation 
suggests that the provision of both descriptive and injunctive messages can affect individuals’ 
behavior by reducing water and electricity use (Bernedo et al. 2014; Allcott and Rogers 2014; Ito 
et al. 2014; Ferraro and Price 2013; Costa and Kahn 2013; Ayres et al. 2013; Smith and Visser 
2013; Mizobuchi and Takeuchi 2013; Ferraro et al. 2011; Allcott 2011).2 There is also evidence 
on the effects of non-pecuniary incentives on other pro-environmental behaviors (see, e.g., 
Chong et al. 2015; Gupta 2011). This suggests that behavioral policies could produce similar 
effects as classical price interventions (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010).3  
In this paper, we investigate spillover effects of a social information campaign aimed at 
encouraging residential water savings in a Colombian town. Specifically, we are interested in 
evaluating whether households that were not targeted by the campaign, but potentially knew of 
its existence, also decreased water use. The campaign was organized as a randomized field 
experiment, and it was implemented in partnership with the local water utility. In this town, both 
the local government and the water utility, which is state-owned, consider it important to 
incentivize residential water savings.4  
This paper extends previous research in three respects. First, despite the extensive 
evidence on the effects of norm-based messages on households’ resource usage, existing 
                                                
1 Once a norm is internalized in an individual’s own value system, her behavior in accordance with or against the 
norm will also result in feelings of self-respect or guilt (Elster 1989; Young 2008).  
2 An overview of the main features of the experimental design and the main results of these information campaigns 
is presented in Table A1, Appendix A.  
3 In contrast, information without a social comparison is not likely to achieve much saving (Smith and Visser 2013; 
Ek and Söderholm 2010).  
4 The water sector in Colombia is regulated by the Public Residential Services Law of 1994. According to this law, 
water policy, among other things, aims at protecting the poor through a cross-subsidies scheme in the form of area-
based tariffs. Specifically, dwellings are classified into six socio-economic strata. Residential users belonging to 
the high-income class (strata 5-6), as well as industrial and commercial customers, pay a surcharge corresponding 
to 20% of their water and sewage bill. The money from the surcharge is then used to subsidize the basic 
consumption of users belonging to the lower-income class (strata 1-3). Subsidies are limited to covering up to 
50%, 40% and 15% of the average service cost in strata 1, 2 and 3, respectively (Gomez-Lobo and Contreras 
2003). Since its establishment in 1994, this policy has been used and refined by successive governments. 
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literature has focused exclusively on direct effects. Following the literature on spillover effects in 
program evaluation (Fafchamps and Vicente 2013; Godlonton and Thornton 2013; Godlonton 
and Thornton 2012; Dickinson and Pattanayak 2011; Conley and Udry 2010; Duflo and Saez 
2003), we propose a methodology that allows a separation of direct and spillover effects of the 
information campaign. We then investigate the role of social networks in information 
dissemination. In particular, we evaluate whether both direct and spillover effects are stronger 
for households that are socially connected with those directly targeted by the campaign. This is, 
therefore, the first attempt to evaluate both spillover effects and network effects in social 
campaigns aimed at promoting water/energy conservation.  
Second, most of the studies have been conducted in developed countries; the only 
exception of which we are aware is Smith and Visser (2013) in South Africa. It is possible, 
perhaps even likely, that the effect of social information is context and institution specific. In 
particular, in a developing country, households will be relatively poor, and trust in institutions is 
lower than in more developed countries (Knack and Keefer 1997). Furthermore, for political 
reasons, reform of water pricing is often difficult. Water is often subsidized in order to support 
poor households. However, in many cases, subsidy schemes affect all households, which could 
result in overconsumption.  
Third, unlike previous studies, we also collect detailed household information through an 
ex-ante and ex-post survey. This enables us to investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment 
effects and shed some light on the underlying mechanisms. Understanding this heterogeneity is 
important not only for improving the cost-effectiveness of behavioral interventions, but also for 
policy design and decision making.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. 
The empirical strategy is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, the main results are discussed. 
Finally, Section 5 provides the main conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2. Experimental Design 
2.1 Context   
The randomized field experiment took place in the town of Jericó, a small town situated 
in the southwestern region of Antioquia in Colombia. All households in the town receive water 
subsidies. Moreover, water-saving infrastructure is limited, individuals do not consider water 
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scarcity a problem, and water usage in the town is very high (Cortés 2012).5 However, both the 
local water utility EPJ (Empresas Públicas de Jericó) and the municipality of Jericó are 
concerned with encouraging households to save water.  
According to EPJ, there are several reasons for this concern.6 First, most residential water 
use is subsidized by the block pricing system. Second, the tariff reflects neither administration, 
maintenance and supply costs nor the value of investments to provide the service.7 Third, water 
discharge rates are very high and the corresponding cost of wastewater treatment is also high. 
Fourth, since EPJ is running a deficit, the municipality has to provide additional funds to the 
utility; consequently, the provision of other municipal services could be affected by the high 
water use. Finally, there are concerns that increased weather variability due to climate change 
could reduce water supply and, as a result, affect the energy supply, because the region relies 
heavily on hydropower.    
2.2 Sampling and Household Data   
According to the current EPJ records, there are 2,558 residential customers in Jericó. We 
include all active urban residential accounts whose meters fulfill the technical requirements,8 
which means that there are in total 1,857 households in our sample.  
Before the implementation of the experiment, we conducted a survey in December 2012 
to collect information at the household level. The survey included questions on socio-economic 
characteristics, water-saving facilities, behavioral actions toward water/energy conservation, 
personal values and perceptions regarding water conservation, social norms, and social 
networks.9 The surveys were conducted via personal interviews in the respondents’ homes. In 
                                                
5 Information provided by the water utility reveals that 50% of the households belonging to the lower income 
stratum exhibit overconsumption (i.e., their monthly water consumption exceeds 20 m3). These figures are 38.3% 
and 39.5% for households in strata 2 and 3, respectively.  
6 The following reasons were cited in a personal interview with the EPJ manager, which took place in April 2013 in 
the EPJ headquarters in Jericó. 
7 At the time of the interview, an increase in the tariff was under discussion, but the public was unaware of this. The 
new tariff was adopted after this experiment was complete. It still will not cover the full cost of providing water. 
8 The manager of EPJ informed us that some meters suffer from technical problems and will be replaced in the 
coming months. After analyzing their performance in the five months preceding the campaign, we defined all 
meters working perfectly for a period of at least three months as technically suitable. This criterion allows us to 
control for potential intentional manipulations by consumers.  
9 The survey implementation was carried out with the technical and logistical support of EPJ, Normal School of 
Jericó, and National University of Colombia, Campus Medellín.  
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total, 1,548 households were contacted and 1,311 households participated in the survey.10 The 
response rate was thus nearly 85%.11 We also conducted an ex-post survey in April 2014. It 
consisted of an extended version of the ex-ante survey, in which additional questions, aimed at 
identifying household networks and their characteristics, were introduced.  
2.3 The Information Campaign  
Interviewed households were randomly allocated to either a treatment group (also called 
the targeted group or the campaign subjects) or an untargeted group, with 656 households in the 
treatment group and 655 in the untargeted group. In the treatment group, households received 
personalized consumption reports, including a message appealing to both descriptive and 
injunctive norms. This report was received monthly with the water bill, for one year, starting in 
January 2013. The information contained in the reports was based on the billed water 
consumption of the corresponding month. The untargeted group received no reports or other 
messages, but members of that group were likely to know that some people in the community 
were receiving such information. An additional control group in a neighboring town was unlikely 
to know anything about the information campaign. 
The experimental design closely follows the design of previous experiments (Ferraro and 
Price 2013; Costa and Kahn 2013; Ayres et al. 2013; Allcott 2011). The only difference is the 
definition of neighbors, which in our case are defined as “households with similar characteristics 
in terms of water needs.” In order to capture households’ similarities, we use information 
regarding household size and age distribution of its members so as to normalize household size 
into Adult Equivalent Units (AEU).12 Based on this distribution, which ranges from 1 to 9.4, 
households were divided into three comparison groups: (1) Small (1 ≤ AEU < 2), (2) medium (2 
≤ AEU < 5), and (3) large (AEU ≥ 5). Monthly water consumption in the reports is also 
expressed in AEU. This classification not only accounts for differences in household 
composition but also for economies of scale in water consumption within households (Haughton 
and Khandker 2009). This differs from previous studies, which compared houses with similar 
size and heating type.  
                                                
10 Although the households under study were previously identified, there were some difficulties in the field affecting 
the number of households to be interviewed. First, addresses were either repeated or non-existent in 232 cases. 
Second, 50 houses were uninhabited. Third, 19 residences are utilized for recreational purposes. Fourth, eight 
dwellings were either demolished, under construction or being remodeled. 
11 Non-responses are explained by two main reasons. First, individuals were on vacation at the time of the survey 
implementation. This accounts for 23.1% of non-responses. Second, individuals refused to answer the survey. This 
is the main reason for non-responses. 
12 We use the following scale: AEU = 1 + 0.7*(Nadults –1) + 0.5*Nchildren[6-18) + 0.3*Nchildren(<6) 
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Following Allcott (2011), the consumption reports had three components. The first is the 
Social Comparison Component, including descriptive and injunctive norms.13 In the descriptive 
norm section, each household is compared to the mean and 25th percentile of its comparison 
group.14 The injunctive norm section categorizes households as “Excellent,” “Average” or 
“Room to improve.”15 The second is the Information Component, in which households are given 
a detailed explanation of the environmental implications of being in a specific category. 
Furthermore, it provides information regarding the number of households joining the most 
efficient group in the current month. Finally, the third is the Opting-out Component, in which 
households are given the option to stop receiving consumption feedback. This one-treatment 
design is equivalent to the strict social norms treatment in Ferraro and Price (2013). Figure 1 
provides an example of a consumption report, translated from Spanish.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
2.4 Mechanisms of Effects 
To conceptualize the channels through which the campaign operates, we assume a model 
in the spirit of both Levitt and List (2007) and Ferraro and Price (2013). Individuals experience 
moral utility from saving water because this contributes to ameliorating the negative external 
effects of overconsumption of water. This moral utility also depends on whether an individual 
behaves according to the notion of an acceptable level of water use in society (if such a notion 
exists), and on the extent to which an individual’s actions are observed by others. We further 
assume that, even if an individual’s own actions are unobserved, her utility will be affected by 
the knowledge that the actions of others have been observed, which raises the possibility that her 
own actions might be observed someday. We also assume that this effect on moral utility will be 
                                                
13 Cialdini (2003) suggests that the extent to which social information affects behavior depends not only on the 
information regarding what others do (i.e., descriptive messages) but also on whether approval of certain behavior 
is transmitted (i.e., injunctive messages).  
14 In Allcott (2011), a household comparison group consisted of approximately 100 geographically-proximate 
households with similar characteristics, including square footage and heating type. 
15 Cialdini (2003) states that “Descriptive norms are relatively easy to accommodate because they are based in the 
raw behavior of individuals. In contrast, injunctive norms are based in an understanding of the moral rules of 
society; hence they required more cognitive assessment in order to operate successfully. As a result, one might 
expect that the impact of injunctive normative information would be mediated through cognitive assessments of the 
quality or persuasiveness of the normative information” (op. cit., page 4). 
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greater in so far as individuals are socially connected with those whose actions have been 
observed. This can be due to either environmental and status concerns (see, e.g., Schnellenbach 
2012; Young 2008) or expectations regarding the observability of the individual’s own actions in 
the future.  
Because the provision of social information creates/reinforces the notion of an acceptable 
level of water use, households receiving consumption reports are more likely to experience moral 
payoffs, compared with those that do not receive such reports. Moreover, by receiving 
consumption reports, households realize their actions are being observed. Therefore, we would 
expect a reduction in average water use of households in the treatment group, compared with 
those in either the untargeted group (in the same town) or the additional control group (in a 
different town). 
Similarly, by learning about the existence of the consumption reports, an individual who 
was not targeted by the campaign could become aware of the importance of saving water. 
Moreover, by knowing that the actions of others have been observed, an individual could also 
come to expect that her own actions may be observed in the future. Therefore, we would expect a 
reduction in average water use of households that, despite not being targeted by the campaign, 
find out about the consumption reports, compared with households that, because they are in 
another town, are not likely to find out that the campaign existed.  
Finally, an individual socially linked to people whose actions are being observed by the 
campaign subjects is more likely to experience larger moral payoffs. This is because her current 
or future actions could be visible not only to the campaign subjects but also to individuals in her 
network. Not saving water could then result in a reduction in utility. Hence, we would expect a 
further reduction in average water use of households (either directly targeted by the campaign or 
not targeted but aware of the campaign) that are socially linked to treated households, compared 
to households that are not socially linked.     
2.5 Identifying Spillover Effects  
Due to network or other contextual effects, the impact of the intervention could thus go 
beyond the group of households that receive consumption reports. This complicates the 
evaluation of the information campaign, as treatment and control groups are no longer separated 
(Abbring and Heckman 2007). In an attempt to account for spillover effects of this campaign, we 
include a neighboring town, Támesis, with characteristics similar to Jericó, as an additional 
control. A random sample of 500 households was selected from the list of residential customers 
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in this town.16 These households also responded to the ex-ante and ex-post surveys, and the local 
water utility, EPT (Empresas Públicas de Támesis) provided us with monthly consumption data. 
Jericó and Támesis are not only geographically close but they also exhibit similar characteristics 
in terms of topography, demographics and economic activity that make them comparable (PDM 
2008-2011b).17 Water provision in both towns is administered by public utilities that share the 
same principles, charge similar tariffs and serve about the same number of users. The spatial 
distribution of both the households participating in the campaign, and the treated and control 
towns, are presented in Figures A1-A2, Appendix A.    
In the analysis, we distinguish between treated and control towns (i.e., Jericó and 
Támesis, respectively). Additionally, treated households in Jericó are regarded as targeted whilst 
control households in Jericó are regarded as untargeted. Households in Támesis are regarded as 
control. This approach facilitates the analysis of spillover effects of the campaign in two 
different ways. First, the introduction of a clean control enables us to assess the presence of 
spillover effects. This is done by comparing individuals who are potentially aware of the 
consumption reports (i.e., untargeted households) with individuals who will never realize its 
existence (i.e., control households). Second, we can investigate the role of social networks in 
information dissemination. By identifying targeted households that are socially linked with either 
targeted or untargeted households, we are able to disentangle diffusion effects (i.e., spillovers 
resulting from communication between targeted and untargeted individuals) from reinforcement 
effects (i.e., spillovers resulting from communication among targeted individuals) (Fafchamps 
and Vicente 2013). Because this analysis sheds light on the role of social networks in the 
dissemination of information, it is also informative for policy design. 
2.6 Data and Baseline Characteristics  
The water utilities gave us access to monthly consumption data from December 2011 to 
December 2013. Because consumption reports were sent between January 2013 and January 
2014, we have a number of pre- and post-treatment observations.18 Table 1 presents the average 
pre- and post-treatment water use for the targeted, untargeted and control households. A 
household’s average consumption ranges between 12.7-14.4 m3/month and, as expected, water 
consumption is higher in households with a larger number of adult equivalents. It should also be 
                                                
16 Users were randomly selected, as all the meters were working perfectly according to the local water utility.  
17 At present, Támesis has 15,714 inhabitants, of whom 6,397 live in the urban area.  
18 Following Allcott (2011), any meter read more than 30 days after the first reports were delivered are considered 
post-treatment.  
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mentioned that water consumption varies over the year, but that the variation is similar across the 
different groups. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
To begin with, we investigate the characteristics of the targeted, untargeted and control 
households in the pre-treatment period. Tables A2-A4, in Appendix A, present the results of two 
procedures for testing the balance of both average water use and household characteristics in the 
pre-treatment period. The first test consists of the standard difference in means. This is followed 
by the normalized differences suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), which are defined as 
the difference in averages by treatment status, scaled by the square root of the sum of the 
variances, as a scale-free measure of the difference in distributions.19 As a rule of thumb, if 
normalized differences exceed 0.25, not only are the sample distributions different, but linear 
regression methods tend to be sensitive to the chosen specification. This approach is particularly 
important in this experiment because randomization took place at an individual rather than town 
level. 
When comparing the targeted and untargeted households in Jericó, there is no evidence of 
statistically significant differences between the two groups. However, there are statistically 
significant differences between households in Jericó (both for targeted and untargeted 
households) and households in the control town. Specifically, the average water consumption of 
targeted and untargeted households differs from that of households in the control group. 
Although the differences are statistically significant, the normalized differences are small (0.13 
and 0.10, respectively). Moreover, some characteristics regarding dwellings and water 
infrastructure in the house are also statistically significantly different among groups;20 however, 
                                                
19 Specifically: ∆!= !!!!!!!!! !!!, where, for w=0,1, !!! = !! − !! !/(!! − 1)!:!!!!  is the sample variance of Xi, in 
the subsample with treatment Wi=w. According to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), the reason for focusing on the 
normalized difference rather than on the t-statistic comes from their relationship to the sample size. For instance, 
while quadrupling the sample size leads, in expectation, to a doubling of the t-statistic, increasing the sample size 
does not systematically affect the normalized difference. 
20 Targeted households in Jericó seem to be wealthier than households in the control group in Támesis, as they 
inhabit their own houses, live in bigger houses and have water-saving equipment such as water storage tanks and 
water-saving watering machines. A similar pattern is observed when comparing untargeted households in Jericó 
with households in the control town.   
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normalized differences exceed the threshold in only a few cases. Consequently, it will be 
important to take these differences into account in the econometric analysis. 
2.7 Measures of Social Networks  
Following Fafchamps and Vicente (2013), we assume that there are two channels that 
could explain information dissemination: geographic proximity and social proximity. Using 
information from the two surveys, we generate four measures of geographic proximity: (1) 
average distance to targeted households, (2) distance to the nearest targeted household, (3) 
number of targeted households within a radius of 10 to 50 m, and (4) distance to the main square. 
The first three measures are intended to capture the likelihood of discussing everyday issues with 
targeted neighbors, and the fourth captures the accessibility to the main focal point in the town.21 
These variables are summarized in the upper panel in Table 2. 
Households are located, on average, within 10 m of the nearest household that was 
targeted by the campaign. The number of targeted neighbors located within a radius of 10 to 50 
m ranges from 1.3 to 10.4 households. This implies that the likelihood of knowing a household 
that was targeted by the campaign is high. Moreover, households are located, on average, within 
400 m of the main square, implying that they can easily access one of the main places where 
social interactions take place. It is worth mentioning that normalized differences do not exceed 
the threshold of 0.25 except in one case: the average distance to treated households.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Social proximity is proxied by the share of households that are members of the same 
churches (Godlonton and Thornton 2012), have children in the same schools, and participate in 
the same civic associations (e.g., board of neighbors, cash transfer programs, and environmental, 
youth and elderly associations). These variables are intended to capture the interactions of 
targeted households with other households that share common interests. One may assume that 
co-members not only talk to each other more frequently but also discuss personal matters. These 
variables are summarized in the lower panel in Table 2. The shares of church and school co-
members are, on average, 31% and 4% of the households targeted by the campaign, respectively. 
                                                
21 As in other Colombian towns, most social interactions take place in the main square. Because the cathedral and 
most restaurants, supermarkets and shops are located in its vicinity, this place is regarded by the inhabitants of 
Jericó as their main meeting point.    
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However, the normalized difference corresponding to the share of church co-members also 
exceeds the threshold of 0.25. Moreover, participation in civic organizations is rather low, as, on 
average, households participate in less than one organization. To summarize, because the number 
of participants in the campaign is rather large, in this study we could not rely on measures of 
kinship and chatting, as in Fafchamps and Vicente (2013).   
3. Empirical Strategy 
The empirical strategy is based on reduced form specifications. The estimand of interest 
is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) in the population of households participating in the 
experiment. The ATE is the expected effect of the treatment on a randomly drawn person from 
the population and is defined as α = E[!!"! − !!"! ], where !!"!  and !!"!  are the potential outcomes for 
household i’s water use at time t if the household was targeted or was not targeted by the 
campaign, respectively (Wooldridge 2010; Blundell and Costa 2009). Because households were 
given the possibility of opting out, the treatment group is defined as those sent the consumption 
reports or those actively opting out. Nevertheless, because only four households opted out, the 
treatment group can still be regarded as a random draw of the population. We are interested in 
three main effects: (1) homogeneous treatment effects assuming no spillovers, (2) homogeneous 
treatment effects accounting for spillovers, and (3) heterogeneous treatment effects due to social 
networks.  
3.1 Homogeneous Treatment Effects Assuming No Spillovers 
To begin with, we are interested in evaluating the direct effect of the campaign under the 
assumption of no spillovers. This gives us the change in water use of the average household that 
was targeted by the campaign when spillover effects are ruled out by assumption. The primary 
specification consists of the difference-in-differences estimator, in which water use is given by: !!" = !!!!!" + !!!" + !! + !! + !!",                                            (1) 
where: yit denotes household i’s water use in period t; Ti is a treatment status indicator that is 
equal to 1 if the household was targeted by the campaign, and 0 otherwise; Pit is a post-treatment 
indicator that is equal to 1 from February 2013 onward, and 0 otherwise; µt denotes month-by-
year dummy variables; vi are household fixed effects; and !!" is the error term. Due to 
randomization, the direct effect of the campaign is consistently estimated by the parameter α. 
This equation is estimated by using a standard fixed effects estimator (OLS) and standard errors 
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are clustered at the household level. Because spillovers are ruled out by assumption, this 
specification exclusively compares targeted and untargeted households.  
3.2 Homogeneous Treatment Effects Accounting for Spillover Effects 
Next, we focus on evaluating spillover effects of the campaign. The treatment effect can 
be decomposed into a direct and indirect effect. The direct effect stems from the treatment itself, 
whereas the indirect effect could be induced by factors unrelated to the campaign (Fafchamps 
and Vicente 2013). Because the sample of targeted and untargeted households does not allow us 
to account for such effects, we now need to use the households in the control town as well. 
Because households in these towns differ in terms of observable characteristics, we identify a 
“matched” control group in Támesis that is similar to the group of targeted/untargeted 
households in Jericó in terms of the core characteristics explaining water use. This control group 
is then utilized for estimating spillover effects by means of the difference-in-difference estimator 
in Equation (1). The identification strategy follows the procedure described by Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009). In the first stage, using data from the ex-ante survey, we estimate propensity 
scores for each household using a probit model. After dropping the observations that fall outside 
the common support, households are matched on the basis of the propensity scores.22 Equation 
(1) is then estimated on the matched sample by means of weighted regressions, in which control 
observations are weighted based on the number of times they were included as matches.  
This procedure allows us to identify two different but important effects. First, by 
comparing untargeted households in Jericó with control households in Támesis, we estimate 
spillover effects of the campaign, i.e., we test whether households in Jericó that were not targeted 
by the campaign were indirectly treated, and therefore changed their water use. Second, by 
comparing targeted households in Jericó with control households in Támesis, we estimate the 
total effect of the campaign on the average targeted household. In the absence of spillovers, this 
effect should coincide with that in the previous section. Hence, the comparison of targeted 
households in Jericó with control households in Támesis can be used as a robustness check of the 
effects of the campaign. 
                                                
22 We use a nearest neighbor 1-to-4 with replacement and a caliper of 0.01 as the matching method. While the 
nearest neighbor method imputes the missing potential outcome for each subject by using an average of the 
outcomes of similar subjects receiving the treatment, the caliper specifies the maximum distance at which two 
observations are a potential match (Abadie et al. 2004).    
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3.3 Heterogeneous Effects Due to Social Networks: Reinforcement and Diffusion 
Effects 
Finally, we are interested in evaluating the role of social networks in the dissemination of 
the information provided by the campaign.23 If information is mainly disseminated through 
social networks, the ATEs will be stronger on households that are more closely linked to targeted 
households. Fafchamps and Vicente (2013) distinguish two types of effects: reinforcement and 
diffusion effects. The first occurs when targeted households are close to each other in a social or 
geographical sense, i.e., the treatment effect is strengthened because targeted households are 
socially connected. The second occurs when untargeted households are socially close to targeted 
households, i.e., information is disseminated from targeted to untargeted individuals. The 
specification to be estimated augments Equation (1) as follows: !!" = !!!!!!!" + !!!!!" + !!!" + !! + !! + !!",                                    (2) 
where ni is the demeaned measure of social connectedness24 (i.e., social or geographic 
proximity). The parameter of interest is θ, which measures the extent to which social networks 
affect household behavior, while the ATE is still captured by α.  
4. Results 
4.1 Homogeneous Treatment Effects Assuming No Spillovers 
We begin by analyzing the direct effects of the campaign. Estimates corresponding to the 
primary specification given by Equation (1) are summarized in Table 3. Columns (1)-(4) 
evaluate the effect of the campaign for the whole group of households participating in the 
experiment, whereas Columns (5)-(8) restrict the analysis to the subsample of households whose 
meters worked perfectly during the study period. Because water consumption was normalized by 
dividing it by the average post-treatment control group consumption and multiplying by 100, 
estimated parameters capturing the ATEs can be interpreted as percentages of change (Allcott 
2011). 
                                                
23 Spillovers cannot necessarily be attributed to social networks. For instance, individuals visiting the water utility or 
the payment places could unintentionally find out about the reports.  
24 The measures of social connectedness are demeaned as follows: !! = !!! − !! !!!!!!! , where N is the total sample 
size and !!!is a given measure of social/geographic proximity. By demeaning the covariates before forming 
interactions, we reduce the problem with multicollinearity (Wooldridge 2010). Also, by demeaning the variables, 
the parameters α and θ can be interpreted as the ATE and the differentiated effect of the ATE due to social 
networks, respectively. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, measures of distance are defined as the 
negative of the distance from household i to the place/household of interest.  
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The campaign has a positive and statistically significant effect on residential water 
savings. In particular, targeted households decreased their water use by 4.6%, compared with 
untargeted households in Jericó, during the first six months after the start of the experiment. 
After 11 months, the effect was 5.4%.25 Our findings are consistent with those of Ferraro and 
Price (2013), who found a reduction in water use of about 4.8% in their strong social norm 
treatment.  
 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here] 
Because the selection criterion for participating in the experiment included households 
whose meters worked in at least three out of the five months preceding the campaign, it is likely 
that some meters stopped functioning in a particular month. If this happens, the water utility 
charges the household the observed average consumption during the previous six months; in that 
case, changes in behavior of those households cannot be identified. Consequently, estimates 
including the entire group of participants can be interpreted as the lower bound of the ATE. Once 
the sample is restricted to households whose meters always worked (i.e., 73% of households), 
reduction in water use reaches 5.8% and 6.8%, 6 and 11 months after having been sent the first 
reports. Because information on the performance of meters comprises both unintended 
malfunction of meters (e.g., leakages, stopped and reversed meters) and intended malfunctions 
(e.g., covered meters that cannot be read), the assessment of the effects of the campaign will be 
more reliable when focusing on working meters. Therefore, the remaining analysis will be based 
on this subsample.   
Figure 2 displays the monthly evolution of the ATE during the treatment period. There is 
an immediate effect of the treatment. Water use decreases by 8.9% in the first month following 
the experiment. From the second month onward, reductions in water use are, on average, 6.8%. 
Monthly ATEs are statistically significant at the 5% level in all periods.  
Although the design of the campaign does not allow us to test the specific channels 
through which it operates, we can still investigate the extent to which households with different 
characteristics responded to the treatment. Following Ludwig et al. (2011), we identify a set of 
policy moderators (i.e., a set of characteristics that may influence the policy impact of the 
campaign). These characteristics are grouped into three categories: policy design, scope for 
water-savings, and ex-ante beliefs about one’s own water use relative to neighbors. We divide 
                                                
25 The ATEs are also robust to model specification: the effect of the campaign remains the same without controlling 
for seasonality.   
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our sample into two subsamples, using the 50th percentile of the distribution of each covariate as 
the cut-off.26 Equation (1) is then estimated for each subsample. Estimation results suggest a 
great deal of heterogeneity, as shown in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The first panel in Table 4 summarizes household responses in the category policy design. 
The treatment effect is significant only for high users of water prior to the campaign and high-
income households. These groups decrease water use by 10.3% and 10.1%, respectively. 
Moreover, ATEs are statistically significantly different, at the 1% level, from the reduction 
among low users and poor households, based on t-tests. This result is particularly important 
because both high users and high-income households put more pressure on the resource, and it 
also implies that non-pecuniary incentives can affect water use without hurting the poor. 
Findings are consistent with those in Allcott (2011), Ferraro and Price (2003), and Ferraro and 
Miranda (2013).  
The second panel in Table 4 presents the heterogeneous responses in the category scope 
for water-savings. Households with older dwellings reduced their water use to a greater extent, 
compared with those in new dwellings. The reduction in water use in this group is 6.2%. This is 
statistically significantly different, at the 1% level, from the reduction among households in new 
dwellings. Although this may appear counter-intuitive, households in new dwellings could be 
less sensitive to the reports because their houses are already equipped with water-saving 
appliances, and their members may think that they are saving water already. The third panel in 
Table 4 displays the results for the category ex-ante beliefs regarding the social norm. As 
expected, households that prior to the campaign believed they were using less water than their 
neighbors (but, in fact, were using more) decreased water use to a greater extent than those who 
believed they were using more water. The ATE for households that initially believed they were 
using less water than their neighbors is 11.9%. The ATEs for households that initially believed 
they were using more water than their neighbors is 0.10%. Differences in treatment effects are 
also statistically significant, at the 1% level.  
Overall, our findings suggest that, as in developed countries, behavioral interventions are 
suitable mechanisms to influence the behavior of households in developing countries. This is 
                                                
26 We follow this approach because our primary interest is to analyze the behavior of a group of individuals with 
similar characteristics over time. Moreover, although the randomization did not take place at the covariate level, 
the characteristics under study are balanced in their corresponding subsamples.  
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particularly important for the management of natural resources in developing countries, where 
price reforms are difficult to implement and trust in local institutions is low.  
4.2 Homogeneous Treatment Effects Accounting for Spillover Effects  
We now relax the assumption of no spillover effects of the information campaign. 
Consequently, the group of untargeted households is no longer a suitable control. We begin by 
analyzing the total effect of the campaign on the group of targeted households. Results are 
presented in Table 5. Columns (1)-(4) correspond to the primary specification in Equation (1) for 
the matched sample of households with working meters. By using the alternative control group 
in Támesis, we can identify a treatment effect only during the first six months following the start 
of the campaign. Although the effect is statistically significant only at the 10% level, its 
magnitude is fairly close to that of the direct effects in the previous section (6.1% vs. 5.8%). The 
effect is no longer statistically significant after eleven months. 
The monthly ATEs are displayed in Figure 3. Once again, estimates reveal an immediate 
and significant response to the treatment during the first and second months. However, the effect 
disappears in the third month but is back again in the sixth month. This jump may suggest that an 
unexpected event affecting water use took place in this particular month. The manager of the 
water utility informed us that indeed a particular event took place in the town in April 2013.27 
This explains why the campaign did not generate an effect in this month. Even though our 
primary specification includes month-by-year dummies, both targeted and untargeted households 
were equally affected by the shock due to randomization, and, therefore, its overall effect on 
water use appears to cancel out when confining the analysis to the households in Jericó. 
Consequently, this particular month is removed from the analysis.28 Estimates of the total effects 
excluding April 2013 are displayed in Columns (5)-(8) in Table 5.        
 
[Insert Table 5 and figure 3 here] 
                                                
27 In March 2013, the Vatican announced the beatification of the first Colombian saint who, coincidentally, was 
originally from Jericó. The ceremony took place in Rome at the beginning of May 2013 and it was transmitted to 
the inhabitants of Jericó from the main square. During April 2013, hundreds of tourists visited the town and a large 
number of households rented out their rooms, as the touristic infrastructure in the county is quite limited. During 
this period, water use was significantly greater than that of the same month in the previous year, as shown in 
Figure A3 in Appendix A. 
28 We also exclude April 2013 from the estimate of the homogeneous effects assuming no spillovers. The effect of 
the campaign after 6 and 11 months reaches 5.8% and 6.9%, respectively. Therefore, results are robust to the 
exclusion of this particular month.  
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After removing this month, we see that the average household participating in the 
experiment reduced water use by 13% and 6.3% the first six and eleven months after the start of 
the experiment. Although the ATE after eleven months is fairly close to that in the previous 
section of this paper (6.4% vs. 6.8%), the effects of the campaign after six months differ to a 
greater extent. Specifically, total effects in Table 5 are significantly larger than direct effects in 
Table 3. Figures reach 13% and 5.8%, respectively. This may indicate that the campaign had a 
larger impact in its early phase than what we find if we compare targeted and untargeted 
households. The bottom panel of Figure 3 displays the monthly ATEs, excluding April 2013. We 
can now observe that the effects are statistically significant, although decreasing over time.  
We now focus on the spillover effects of the campaign. Table 6 presents the estimated 
effect of the campaign on the group of households in Jericó that did not receive consumption 
reports. There is evidence that households not targeted by the campaign also decreased water use 
during the first six months after the start of the experiment. Specifically, the average untargeted 
household reduced water use by 5.8% compared to households in the control group in Támesis. 
This effect is statistically significant at the 0.05% level, and the magnitude and duration are not 
negligible. As far as we know, this is the first empirical evidence of spillover effects of social 
information campaigns aimed at water/energy conservation.  
Monthly ATEs in Figure 4 indicate that, unlike targeted households, households not 
targeted by the campaign but subject to spillover effects take some time before responding to the 
treatment, which is to be expected. In particular, the first significant change is observed after two 
months dating from the start of the campaign; it reaches its maximum after three months and 
then starts to decrease. The effect vanishes from August 2013 onward.29 
 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 here] 
 
Our results suggest that untargeted households are affected by the campaign and change 
their behavior accordingly. There are two possible explanations. First, by becoming aware of the 
                                                
29 Results are also robust to the inclusion of April 2013. Although the estimates corresponding to the first six 
months following the campaign do not present statistically significant differences between untargeted households 
in Jericó and control households in Támesis, the monthly ATEs reveal that untargeted households decreased their 
water use by 9% in the second month following the campaign. This effect is captured when using the samples of 
all households and households with working meters. 
  
18 
campaign, untargeted households also develop the notion of an acceptable level of water use; 
individuals became environmentally concerned and therefore reduce water use. Second, by 
knowing that other households have been treated, untargeted households updated their beliefs 
regarding the likelihood of being treated in the near future. Untargeted households subject to 
spillover effects respond by decreasing water use so as to hear good news if they receive 
consumption reports in the future. Although we are unable to identify the underlying mechanism 
giving rise to spillovers, the fact that the effect is short-lasting points toward the second 
explanation. Because untargeted households did not receive consumption reports in the 
subsequent periods, it is most likely that they revised their beliefs once again, stopping their 
efforts to decrease water use.  
Findings also corroborate the idea that the early effect of the campaign on the average 
targeted household was larger than we initially thought. For the sample of households 
participating in the experiment, the ATE after six months can be calculated by adding the 
homogeneous treatment effect in the absence of spillovers and with spillover effects. By doing 
so, the ATE reaches 11.6%, which is very close to the homogeneous treatment effect when 
accounting for spillovers (i.e., 11.6% vs. 13%).  
To summarize, the analysis of spillovers in water use has a policy implication: as with 
other types of interventions (Fafchamps and Vicente 2013; Godlonton and Thornton 2012; 
Conley and Udry 2010), it is possible to influence the behavior of an entire population by 
targeting only a share of households. However, the spillover effect lasts only a few months. 
Thus, targeting a group of the population would be appropriate if the objective of the 
intervention was to reduce water use during short periods (e.g., droughts). However, if the 
objective is to promote permanent behavioral changes in the entire population, policy makers 
should target all households. 
4.3 Heterogeneous Effects Due to Social Networks: Reinforcement and Diffusion 
Effects 
As a final point, we are interested in evaluating whether the direct and spillover effects of 
the campaign can be ascribed to social networks. Table 7 presents the reinforcement effects 
following the specification in Equation (2). The regression models include measures of both 
geographic and social proximity as proxies of social connectedness.   
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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We begin by evaluating the role of geographic proximity. As can be seen in the left panel 
of Table 7, there is weak evidence of reinforcement effects. Most variables are statistically 
insignificant, but the share of treated households within a radius of 10 meters appears to have a 
negative effect on water savings. Although this finding is in line with that of Godlonton and 
Thornton (2013), it is significant only at the 10% level; hence, it has to be interpreted with 
caution. Results evaluating the role of social proximity are displayed in the right panel of Table 
7. None of our proxies of social proximity are statistically significant, confirming the notion of 
the absence of reinforcement effects. Overall, results suggest that the effect of the campaign was 
mainly driven by receiving the consumption reports and, to a lesser extent, by external factors 
not directly linked with the campaign. This result is not surprising because the campaign was not 
as visible as, for example, the one in Fafchamps and Vicente (2013).  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
We conclude our analysis with the evaluation of diffusion effects, which are presented in 
Table 8. Because spillover effects are observed only within the first six months of the 
experiment, regressions are restricted to the period December 2011 - July 2013. Surprisingly, 
results indicate that untargeted households socially connected with targeted households did not 
change their behavior to a greater extent than those not socially connected. Thus, we find no 
support for a finding that social networks play an important role in disseminating the information 
provided by the campaign. This implies that finding out that the reports exist, i.e., knowing that 
other households were targeted by the campaign, was sufficient to influence the behavior of the 
untargeted households. Note, however, that the estimated ATEs are increased after controlling 
for social networks.   
Because the information provided by the campaign was not public, we expected that 
social networks could play a major role in explaining information dissemination from targeted to 
untargeted households. One possible explanation for the unexpected finding is that, as previously 
mentioned, spillovers are not necessarily attributed to social networks. For instance, untargeted 
individuals visiting the water utility or the payment places could find out about the reports from 
individuals who were targeted by the campaign. Another explanation is that social networks still 
play an important role through channels other than those we have explored so far. Thus, further 
investigation regarding the effects of alternative measures of social connectedness is still needed. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have analyzed the direct and spillover effects of an information 
campaign aimed at encouraging residential water savings in a small Colombian town. The 
campaign was organized as a randomized field experiment, consisting of monthly delivery of 
consumption reports including normative messages during one year. We first evaluated both the 
direct and spillover effects of the campaign. This was followed by an investigation into the 
effects of social networks on information dissemination among households in the town. This 
allowed us to disentangle reinforcement and diffusion effects.       
Results show that social information and appeals to norm-based behavior reduced water 
use. Specifically, homogeneous treatment effects assuming no spillovers reveal that targeted 
households decreased water use by 6.8% during the eleven months following the start of the 
campaign. This finding is not only consistent with the notion that moral payoffs can influence 
consumption decisions but also demonstrates the potential of non-pecuniary incentives as a 
mechanism to influence water use in a setting of a developing country. In addition, the 
heterogeneous treatment effects show that wealthier households and high users of water 
decreased water use to a greater extent than did poorer households and low users of water. This 
finding is highly policy relevant because, while the rationale for subsidies is to benefit the poor, 
wealthier groups are those putting more pressure on the resource. 
Results corresponding to the total effects of the campaign accounting for spillovers are 
also highly policy relevant. The estimated ATEs six months after the start of the campaign are 
significantly larger than those resulting when assuming no spillovers. This suggests that the 
campaign may have a larger impact in its early phase. Households not targeted by the campaign 
reduced water use by 5.8% in the first six months following the experiment. To the best of our 
knowledge, this finding is the first piece of evidence of the presence of spillover effects in social 
information campaigns aimed at water/energy conservation, which is a major contribution to the 
growing literature in this field. This suggests that non-pecuniary incentives can be suitable and 
inexpensive instruments for shaping the behavior of an entire population in short-run 
interventions.  
However, we find no evidence of either reinforcement or diffusion effects. There are two 
possible explanations. On the one hand, spillovers may not necessarily be attributable to social 
networks. Thus, finding out about the reports rather than being socially connected is sufficient to 
influence the behavior of households. On the other hand, social networks still could play an 
important role through channels other than those we have explored so far. Unlike Fafchamps and 
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Vicente (2013), we did not identify kinship and chatting as channels for spillover effects, 
possibly because we used a rather large sample. Notwithstanding these concerns, and given the 
magnitude and significance of the spillover effects, further investigation regarding the effects of 
alternative measures of social connectedness is still needed. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Water consumption by comparison groups (m3/month) 
 
Adult equivalent units (AEU) 
Pre-treatment Post-treatment 
Targeted Untargeted Control Targeted Untargeted Control 
Small  households (1 ≤ AEU < 2) 11.75 8.94 10.28 11.07 9.42 9.37 
 (9.28) (6.49) (9.08) (8.42) (6.82) (7.98) 
Medium households (2 ≤ AEU < 5) 14.50 14.87 12.84 13.98 14.85 12.01 
 (7.99) (8.96) (8.92) (8.11) (8.88) (7.97) 
Large households  (AEU ≥ 5) 20.72 20.36 15.74 18.64 20.89 17.92 
 (12.75) (10.23) (11.98) (10.42) (12.83) (13.76) All households 14.36 14.00 12.66 13.72 14.13 12.01 
 (8.77) (9.09) (9.22) (8.47) (9.30) (8.62) 
No. Obs. 656 655 500 656 655 500 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on both EPJ and EPT records, and ex-ante data. Pre-treatment 
corresponds to the period Dec. 2011 – Jan. 2013. Similarly, post-treatment corresponds to the period 
Feb. 2013 – Dec. 2013. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Measures of social networks  
Variable 
 !
Targeted Untargeted Control 
Mean/std. 
Dev. 
Norm. 
Diff. 
Mean/std. 
Dev. 
Norm. 
Diff. 
Mean/std. 
Dev. 
 Geographic proximity 
No. Treated (r=10m) 1.29 
-0.121 
1.35 
-0.090 
1.52 
 (1.28) (1.26) (1.43) 
No. Treated (r=20m) 2.91 
-0.078 
2.97 
-0.057 
3.16 
 (2.14) (2.15) (2.36) 
No. Treated (r=30m) 4.89 
-0.030 
4.98 
-0.010 
5.02 
 (3.03) (3.02) (3.16) 
No. Treated (r=40m) 7.39 
-0.019 
7.56 
0.010 
7.50 
 (4.28) (4.22) (4.18) 
No. Treated (r=50m) 10.29 
0.000 
10.57 
0.035 
10.30 
 (5.59) (5.63) (5.31) 
Average distance to targeted [meters] 512.2 
0.465* 
508.3 
0.438* 
407.5 
 (178.5) (186.9) (89.0) 
Distance to nearest targeted [meters] 12.50 
0.141 
13.39 
0.128 
8.50 
 (26.80) (36.96) (8.25) 
Distance to main square [meters] 386.2 
-0.169 
374.1 
-0.199 
443.1 
 (245.4) (253.3) (225.8) 
 Social proximity 
Share co-members (church) 0.309 
-0.581* 
0.321 
-0.563* 
0.558 
 (0.218) (0.217) (0.272) 
Share co-members (school) 0.036 
-0.099 
0.040 
-0.056 
0.044 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.056) 
No. Associations 0.502 
0.043 
0.496 
0.037 
0.456 
 (0.748) (0.776) (0.746) 
Note: Normalized differences are calculated with respect to the control. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. *Normalized differences exceed the threshold suggested by Wooldridge and Imbens 
(2009).  
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Table 3. Homogeneous treatment effects (Targeted vs. Untargeted) 
VARIABLES 
All households Working meters 
After 6 months After 11 months After 6 months After 11 months 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Post*Treated -4.605** -4.605** -5.447*** -5.447*** -5.844*** -5.844*** -6.822*** -6.822*** 
 (1.997) (1.998) (1.944) (1.945) (2.015) (2.016) (1.999) (2.000) 
Post-treatment -0.221 -13.39*** 0.898 -15.89*** -1.821 -14.39*** -0.550 -14.22*** 
 (1.505) (1.977) (1.471) (1.985) (1.421) (2.097) (1.418) (1.831) 
Constant 101.5*** 115.9*** 100.4*** 114.6*** 106.6*** 120.4*** 105.4*** 119.1*** 
 (0.300) (1.215) (0.428) (1.208) (0.302) (1.333) (0.440) (1.329) 
         
Month-by-year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
No. Obs.  26,220 26,220 32,775 32,775 19,120 19,120 23,900 23,900 
No. Households 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311 956 956 956 956 
R-squared 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.024 0.005 0.045 0.005 0.038 
Note: This table shows estimates of the baseline specification capturing the homogeneous treatment 
effects of the campaign. Estimates correspond to the period Dec. 2011 – Dec. 2013. Columns (1)-(4) 
correspond to the standard diff-in-diff estimator including all households. Columns (5)-(8) correspond 
to the diff-in-diff estimator for the sample of working meters. The dependent variable is monthly water 
use (% change w.r.t. control group). Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 4. Heterogeneous treatment effects (Targeted vs. Untargeted) 
VARIABLES Policy Design Scope for water-savings Ex-ante beliefs Low-users High-users Low-inc. High-inc. New-dwell Old-dwell Owned Non-own Below Average Above 
            
Post*Treated -3.252 -10.27*** -3.826 -10.13*** -5.740 -6.717** -4.247* -10.43*** -11.89*** -6.086*** -0.103 
 (1.991) (3.182) (2.969) (2.837) (3.842) (2.684) (2.372) (3.507) (4.470) (2.298) (10.06) 
Post-treatment -6.733*** -20.38*** -10.09*** -14.12*** -18.74*** -15.99*** -17.75*** -9.064*** -6.177 -15.90*** -19.06*** 
 (2.058) (2.833) (3.348) (3.052) (3.520) (2.608) (2.400) (2.921) (4.628) (2.218) (6.339) 
Constant 68.63*** 161.7*** 117.7*** 118.0*** 111.4*** 123.1*** 121.3*** 115.7*** 106.9*** 121.9*** 137.0*** 
 (1.556) (2.053) (2.057) (1.726) (2.372) (1.978) (1.731) (2.117) (2.433) (1.684) (5.105) 
            
Month-by-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
No. Obs.  10,950 12,950 11,800 11,175 6,331 10,825 13,600 9,969 5,750 16,400 1,250 
No. Households 438 518 472 447 254 434 544 399 230 656 50 
R-squared 0.042 0.055 0.034 0.045 0.035 0.049 0.046 0.033 0.046 0.038 0.063 
Note: This table shows estimates of the baseline specification capturing the heterogeneous effects of the campaign. Estimates correspond to the period December 2011– Dec. 
2013 and include targeted and untargeted households whose meters always worked. The dependent variable is monthly water use (% change w.r.t. untargeted group). 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Homogeneous treatment effects (Targeted vs. Control) 
VARIABLES 
All periods Excluding April 2013 
After 6 months After 11 months After 6 months After 11 months 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Post*Treated -6.071* -6.071* -3.111 -3.111 -13.04*** -13.04*** -6.351* -6.351* 
 (3.455) (3.456) (3.735) (3.737) (3.333) (3.335) (3.697) (3.699) 
Post-treatment -2.060 0.118 -4.586 -12.84*** 1.234 1.523 -3.157 -4.240 
 (3.037) (3.437) (3.344) (3.618) (2.906) (2.366) (3.299) (3.641) 
Constant 109.1*** 108.6*** 111.1*** 110.6*** 109.1*** 108.6*** 111.1*** 110.6*** 
 (0.563) (2.143) (0.899) (2.122) (0.475) (2.177) (0.841) (2.138) 
         
Month-by-year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
No. Obs.  17,440 17,440 21,800 21,800 16,568 16,568 20,928 20,928 
No. Households 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 
R-squared 0.003 0.030 0.004 0.032 0.005 0.034 0.004 0.034 
Note: This table shows estimates of the baseline specification capturing the homogeneous treatment 
effects of the campaign for the group of matched households with working meters. Columns (1)-(4) 
include all periods, whereas Columns (5)-(8) exclude April 2013. Estimates correspond to the period 
Dec. 2011 – Dec. 2013. The dependent variable is monthly water use (% change w.r.t. control group). 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6. Homogeneous treatment effects (Untargeted vs. Control) 
VARIABLES After 6 months After 11 months (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Post*Treated -5.836** -5.836** 2.451 2.451 
 (2.937) (2.938) (3.480) (3.482) 
Post-treatment -0.290 -1.419 -5.088* -4.948 
 (2.416) (3.098) (3.024) (3.258) 
Constant 104.2*** 103.9*** 106.1*** 105.8*** 
 (0.413) (2.307) (0.793) (2.183) 
     
Month-by-year No Yes No Yes 
     
No. Obs.  16,473 16,473 20,808 20,808 
No. Households 867 867 867 867 
R-squared 0.001 0.027 0.002 0.027 
Note: This table shows estimates of the baseline specification capturing the homogeneous treatment 
effects of the campaign for the matched sample of households with working meters. Estimates 
correspond to the period Dec. 2011 – Dec. 2013. April 2013 is excluded from all regressions. The 
dependent variable is monthly water use (% change w.r.t. control group). Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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             Table 7. Reinforcement effects 
VARIABLES 
Geographic proximity Social proximity 
Average 
distance 
Distance 
to nearest 
Distance 
square 
Treated 
(10m) 
Treated 
(20m) 
Treated 
(30m) 
Treated 
(40m) 
Treated 
(50m) 
Church   
co-memb 
School    
co-memb No.org 
            
Post*Treated -9.280** -6.336* -6.363* -6.452* -6.384* -6.354* -6.399* -6.398* -7.074* -6.131* -6.588 
 (4.149) (3.772) (3.633) (3.707) (3.677) (3.733) (3.723) (3.740) (3.982) (3.669) (4.033) 
Post*Treated*n 0.0170 -0.0931 -0.0150 4.074* 2.296 0.598 0.230 0.0864 15.18 58.27 1.010 
 (0.0302) (0.350) (0.0131) (2.410) (1.451) (1.012) (0.714) (0.605) (13.27) (62.94) (8.324) 
Post-treatment*n -0.0367 0.0435 0.00442 -2.773 -1.523 -0.258 -0.336 -0.275 -11.31 -33.63 1.584 
 (0.0294) (0.348) (0.0119) (2.017) (1.240) (0.847) (0.609) (0.531) (10.97) (54.35) (8.048) 
Post-treatment 0.548 -4.332 -2.429 -1.432 -4.081 -14.57*** -14.56*** -14.53*** -3.109 -4.401 -4.048 
 (4.380) (3.631) (3.494) (4.175) (3.635) (3.626) (3.614) (3.634) (3.763) (3.652) (3.967) 
Constant 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 110.6*** 
 (2.144) (2.137) (2.139) (2.145) (2.144) (2.137) (2.136) (2.135) (2.136) (2.133) (2.136) 
            
Month-by-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
No. Obs.  20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 20,928 
No. Households 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 872 
R-squared 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
Note: This table shows estimates of the baseline specification capturing the heterogeneous treatment effects of the campaign for the matched sample of households with 
working meters. Estimates correspond to the period Dec. 2011 – Dec. 2013. April 2013 is excluded from all regressions. The dependent variable is monthly water use (% 
change w.r.t. control group). Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Diffusion effects  
VARIABLES 
Geographic proximity Social proximity 
Average 
distance 
Distance 
to nearest 
Distance 
square 
Treated 
(10m) 
Treated 
(20m) 
Treated 
(30m) 
Treated 
(40m) 
Treated 
(50m) 
Church   
co-memb 
School    
co-memb No.org 
            
Post*Treated -8.073** -5.997* -6.664** -6.210** -6.013** -5.878** -5.877** -5.972** -6.337** -5.926** -5.315* 
 (3.534) (3.137) (2.891) (2.948) (2.941) (2.951) (2.951) (2.989) (3.206) (2.931) (2.969) 
Post*Treated*n 0.0397 0.0551 -0.00737 1.730 0.833 0.0844 0.232 0.368 3.776 -1.423 0.265 
 (0.0291) (0.323) (0.0121) (1.980) (1.294) (0.930) (0.669) (0.545) (11.66) (48.70) (4.614) 
Post-treatment*n -0.0363 -0.0549 0.0113 -2.371 -1.246 -0.176 -0.210 -0.204 -4.717 27.24 -3.702 
 (0.0283) (0.323) (0.0106) (1.631) (1.113) (0.770) (0.569) (0.475) (8.676) (40.76) (4.229) 
Post-treatment 0.942 0.0604 -0.770 -1.089 0.0392 -1.382 -1.379 0.00461 -1.001 -1.271 -1.868 
 (3.468) (2.159) (3.206) (3.112) (2.117) (3.092) (3.100) (2.112) (3.279) (3.124) (3.080) 
Constant 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 103.9*** 
 (2.309) (2.307) (2.310) (2.308) (2.307) (2.307) (2.307) (2.306) (2.305) (2.308) (2.307) 
            
Month-by-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
No. Obs.  16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 16,473 
No. Households 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 
R-squared 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 
Note: This table shows estimates of the baseline specification capturing the heterogeneous treatment effects of the campaign for the matched sample of households with 
working meters. Estimates correspond to the period Dec. 2011 – Jul. 2013. April 2013 is excluded from all regressions. The dependent variable is monthly water use (% 
change w.r.t. control group). Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Example of consumption report 
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Figure 2. Monthly direct effects (Targeted vs. Untargeted) 
!
 
Figure 3. Monthly combined effects including (left) and excluding (right) April 
2013 (Targeted vs. Control) 
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Figure 4. Monthly spillover effects (Untargeted vs. Control - Excluding April 
2013) 
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Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figures 
 
 Table A1. Overview of social information campaigns aimed at water/energy conservation 
Author Type Objective Experimental design Main results 
Allcott (2011) Electricity 
! To conduct an impact 
evaluation of the most 
notable non-price energy 
conservation program in 
the U.S.  
! Treatment consisted of the 
delivery of energy report letters, 
including conservation tips and 
descriptive and injunctive social 
norms.  
! About 600,000 households across 
the US were divided into one of 
17 experimental populations. 
! Reports were first sent during 
Spring 2008, for an indefinite 
period. 
! The average household receiving the “Home 
Energy Report” decreases electricity use by 
about 3%.  
! Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) are 
equivalent to an 11-20% short-run price 
increase or a 5% long-run price increase. 
! After 2 years of treatment, there is no 
evidence of a decline in ATEs. 
Ferraro et al. (2011) Water 
! To analyze how different 
norm-based strategies 
influence long-run 
patterns of residential 
water use in Metropolitan 
Atlanta (Georgia).  
! Follow-up of the households that 
participated in Ferraro and Price 
(2013) experiment, 2 years after 
its implementation.  
! Analysis of post-treatment 
residential water demand, over 
the period 2007-2009. 
! Within a year, there are no significant 
differences in water use between the weak 
social norm treatment and the control group. 
In contrast, there is still a treatment effect 
after more than two years in the strong 
social norms treatment group. 
! Evidence of waning: ATE2008 > ATE2009. 
Mizobuchi and Takeuchi (2013) Electricity 
! To examine the influence 
of economic and 
psychological factors on 
electricity conservation 
behavior in Matsuyama 
(Japan). 
! 236 households in 2 treatments: 
monetary rewards and monetary 
rewards with comparative 
feedback. Households were 
aware of their participation in the 
experiment. 
! Duration: 8 weeks. 
! The ATE for households in the reward 
treatment is 5.9%. In contrast, households 
that were provided with both economic 
rewards and comparative feedback 
decreased electricity use by 8.2%. 
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Table A1. Overview of social information campaigns aimed at water/energy conservation (Continued) 
Ferraro and Price (2013) Water 
! To examine the effect of 
norm-based messages on 
residential water demand 
in Metropolitan Atlanta 
(Georgia). 
! 3 treatments: technical advice, 
weak social norm and strict social 
norm.  
! One-shot experiment: letters were 
sent out on week 21 (2007). 
! 100,000 households participated 
in the experiment. 
! The ATEs for the technical advice, weak 
social norm and strict social norm 
treatments are 1%, 2.8% and 4.8%, 
respectively. The latter corresponds to a 
price increase of 12-15%. 
! The effectiveness of the normative 
messages started to wane after the fourth 
month. 
Costa and Kahn (2013) Electricity ! To evaluate the role of 
political ideology on the 
effectiveness of energy 
conservation nudges.  
! Treatment: delivery of “home 
energy reports”, including 
neighbor comparisons and 
energy-savings tips. 
! Ideology is measured through 
affiliation with political parties, 
donation to environmental 
organizations and purchase of 
green energy. 
! About 85,000 households 
participated in the experiment. 
! Reports were sent between 
March 14 and May 9, 2008. 
! Democratic households reduce consumption 
by 2.4%, while Republican households 
decrease consumption by 1.7%. 
! Households that opted out of the experiment 
were more likely to be both high consumers 
of energy and political conservatives. 
! There are no differential responses between 
political liberals and conservatives to the 
normative message included in the first 
report.    
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Table A1. Overview of social information campaigns aimed at water/energy conservation (Continued) 
Ayres et al. (2013) Electricity 
and  
natural gas  
! To evaluate two natural 
field experiments, 
providing normative 
messages on households’ 
usage of electricity and 
natural gas.  
 
! Two experiments: SMUD 
(electricity) and PSE (electricity 
and gas).  
! In SMUD, reports were delivered 
to high users monthly and to low 
users quarterly. In PSE, the 
frequency of the report was 
randomized.  
! About 84,000 households 
participated in each experiment.  
! Duration: 1 year (SMUD) and 7 
months (PSE).   
! In the SMUD experiment, ATEs are 2.3% 
(high users) and 1.5% (low users). In 
contrast, there are no significant differences 
between households receiving monthly or 
quarterly reports. The average household in 
the PSE experiment reduced energy use by 
1.2%.  
! Evidence of waning. 
! Opting out rates are 2% (SMUD) and 1% 
(PSE). 
Smith and Visser (2013) Water 
! To assess the scope of 
behavioral interventions 
on households’ water use 
in Cape Town.  
! 8 treatments, including social 
norms and the salience of 
household’s own consumption, 
salience of water-savings actions 
and salience of the scrutiny of a 
household’s actions.  
! About 400,000 participated in the 
experiment. 
! The first informational inserts 
were sent in November 2012. 
! Water savings corresponded to 1% of total 
water use in the town. 
! The ATEs are larger when households are 
compared with both neighbors and efficient 
neighbors. 
! This result holds in both the “month-period 
insert” and “year-period insert”. 
Bernedo et al. (2014) Water ! To study the longer-term 
impacts of a one-time 
behavioral nudge aimed at 
promoting residential 
water savings during a 
drought in the U.S.  
! Follow up of the households that 
participated in the experiments by 
Ferraro and Price (2013) and 
Ferraro et al (2011), 6 year after 
its implementation.  
! The treatment effect declines by about 50% 
one year after the letters were sent. 
However, from this year onward, the ATE 
remains steady in both magnitude and 
statistical significance.  
! Persistence of treatment effects suggests the 
presence of longer-lived adjustments to 
either habits or water-savings infrastructure 
at home.  
  
39 
Table A1. Overview of social information campaigns aimed at water/energy conservation (Continued) 
Allcott and Rogers (2014) Electricity ! To estimate the long-run 
effects of the major  non-
price energy conservation 
program in the U.S. 
! Follow up of the households 
targeted by Opower experiments 
in Allcott (2011), 5 years after its 
implementation. 
! Treated households were 
randomly assigned to have 
treatment either discontinued 
after about 2 years or continued 
indefinitely.  
! Households in the discontinuation treatment 
reduced energy use by 2%. However, the 
ATEs decay at a rate of about 10-20% per 
year.   
! Households do not habituate fully even after 
2 years of treatment: ATEs in the third 
through fifth years are 50-60% stronger if 
the intervention is continued instead of 
discontinued. 
Ito et al. (2014) Electricity ! To evaluate the effect of 
intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations on energy 
conservation in peak 
demand hours. 
! Two treatments: moral suasion 
and monetary incentives. 
Households in the former 
received a message requesting 
voluntary energy conservation 
with no monetary incentives. In 
contrast, households in the latter 
received high electricity prices 
during peak demand hours. 
! The interventions were repeated 
so as to analyze immediate versus 
later decision making among the 
groups. 
! The moral suasion group decreases 
electricity use by 8% during the first 
treatment days. However, the effect 
disappears after few days.  
! The monetary incentives group decreases 
electricity use by 17%. The effect is 
persistent not only during repeated 
interventions but also after treatment 
discontinuation.  
! There is evidence of habit formation for the 
monetary treatment only.  
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Figure A1. Spatial distribution of households participating in the experiment 
(Jericó) 
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Figure A2. Spatial distribution of the treated and control towns 
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Table A2. Difference in means (targeted vs. untargeted – pre-treatment) 
 Mean Normalized Difference p-
value 
No. Obs. 
 Untargeted Targeted difference in means Untargeted Targeted 
 Water consumption 
Average consumption (m3/month) 13.99 14.34 0.0278 0.3518 0.476 655 656 
 Socio-economics 
Gender 0.255 0.254 -0.0013 -0.0008 0.973 639 645 
Age 51.6 51.2 -0.0196 -0.4416 0.620 639 645 
Education (years) 8.26 7.94 -0.0485 -0.3265 0.219 639 645 
Household size 3.343 3.338 -0.0019 -0.0047 0.962 639 645 
Adult equivalent units 2.42 2.39 -0.0188 -0.0288 0.630 655 656 
Household income (COP/month) 468111 480577 0.0163 12466 0.679 639 645 
Owned house 0.571 0.569 -0.0032 -0.0022 0.936 639 645 
Rented house 0.351 0.358 0.0112 0.0076 0.776 639 645 
Family house 0.0798 0.0744 -0.0143 -0.0054 0.717 639 645 
 Dwelling 
House size (m2) 62.43 60.78 -0.0280 -1.6550 0.478 639 645 
No. rooms 7.46 7.30 -0.0540 -0.1640 0.171 639 645 
Terrace 0.039 0.042 0.0098 0.0027 0.804 639 645 
Garden 0.19 0.22 0.0483 0.0277 0.221 639 645 
House (several floors) 0.17 0.19 0.0282 0.0154 0.475 639 645 
House (one floor) 0.74 0.73 -0.0286 -0.0178 0.469 639 645 
Apartment (building) 0.0095 0.0093 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.987 639 645 
Apartment (interior) 0.0313 0.0388 0.0287 0.0075 0.468 639 645 
House age 28.43 29.09 0.0287 0.6588 0.468 639 645 
No. years in dwelling 14.13 14.93 0.0360 0.8004 0.362 639 645 
No. months in dwelling (per year) 11.32 11.54 0.0716 0.2188* 0.069 639 645 
 Water infrastructure 
Dual flush toilets 0.119 0.116 -0.0047 -0.0027 0.905 639 645 
Water-saving showerheads 0.100 0.107 0.0122 0.0068 0.757 639 645 
Water-saving sink and dishwasher 0.077 0.076 -0.0014 -0.0007 0.972 639 645 
Water-saving washing machine 0.075 0.059 -0.0458 -0.0162 0.246 639 645 
Water storage tank 0.538 0.499 -0.0526 -0.0391 0.183 639 645 
 Knowledge 
Average water bill (COP/month) 22313 22009 -0.0208 -304.7000 0.599 634 643 
Expensive water will 0.405 0.374 -0.0454 -0.0313 0.261 610 613 
Keep track water consumption 3.94 3.91 -0.0153 -0.0318 0.699 634 644 
 Social capital and Networks 
Time in county (years) 23.62 23.72 0.0060 0.0945 0.879 633 643 
No. organizations 1.00 0.93 -0.0349 -0.0718 0.376 630 655 
Source: Own elaboration. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. COP refers to Colombian peso. 1 US$ = 
1847.91 COP (21-05-2013).  
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Table A3. Difference in means (targeted vs. control – pre-treatment)  
 Mean Normalized Difference p-value No. Obs. 
 Control Targeted difference in means Control Targeted 
 Water consumption 
Average consumption (m3/month) 12.66 14.34 0.1311 1.683*** 0.002 500 656 
 Socio-economics 
Gender 0.248 0.254 0.0102 0.0063 0.809 500 645 
Age 48.54 51.2 0.1168 2.6550*** 0.005 500 645 
Education (years) 7.16 7.94 0.1230 0.7804*** 0.004 500 645 
Household size 3.25 3.34 0.0334 0.0840 0.427 500 645 
Adult equivalent units 2.38 2.39 0.0090 0.0134 0.830 500 656 
Household income (COP/month) 518908 480577 -0.0565 -38330 0.192 500 645 
Owned house 0.486 0.569 0.1170 0.0830*** 0.005 500 645 
Rented house 0.412 0.3581 -0.0781 -0.0539* 0.063 500 645 
Family house 0.102 0.074 -0.0686 -0.0276* 0.099 500 645 
 Dwelling 
House size (m2) 45.61 60.78 0.2724 15.17*** 0.000 500 645 
No. rooms 6.73 7.30 0.1927 0.5717*** 0.000 500 645 
Terrace 0.078 0.04186 -0.1073 -0.0361*** 0.009 500 645 
Garden 0.228 0.2202 -0.0132 -0.0078 0.754 500 645 
House (several floors) 0.172 0.1907 0.0343 0.0187 0.417 500 645 
House (one floor) 0.768 0.7287 -0.0639 -0.0393 0.130 500 645 
Apartment (building) 0.014 0.0093 -0.0309 -0.0047 0.457 500 645 
Apartment (interior) 0.044 0.0387 -0.0186 -0.0052 0.658 500 645 
House age 27.89 29.09 0.0538 1.2070 0.204 500 645 
No. years in dwelling 14.69 14.93 0.0108 0.2399 0.798 500 645 
No. months in dwelling (per year) 11.86 11.54 -0.1463 -0.3236*** 0.001 500 645 
 Water infrastructure 
Dual flush toilets 0.146 0.116 -0.0530 -0.0297 0.210 500 645 
Water-saving showerheads 0.124 0.107 -0.0312 -0.0170 0.464 500 645 
Water-saving sink and dishwasher 0.086 0.076 -0.0217 -0.0100 0.610 500 645 
Water-saving washing machine 0.146 0.059 -0.2008 -0.0871*** 0.000 500 645 
Water storage tank 0.072 0.495 0.5999 0.4226*** 0.000 500 645 
 Knowledge 
Average water bill (COP/month) 13121 22009 0.5615 8887*** 0.000 500 643 
Expensive water will 0.361 0.374 0.0182 0.0124 0.674 479 613 
Keep track water consumption 4.00 3.91 -0.0397 -0.0830 0.346 500 644 
 Social capital and Networks 
Time in county (years) 25.78 23.72 -0.1472 -2.0650*** 0.001 500 643 
No. organizations 0.8120 0.9282 0.0625 0.1162 0.141 500 655 
Source: Own elaboration. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4. Difference in means (untargeted vs. control – pre-treatment)  
 Mean Normalized Difference p-
value 
No. Obs. 
 Control Untargeted  difference in means Control Untargeted  
 Water consumption 
Average consumption (m3/month) 12.66 13.99 0.1023 1.331** 0.014 500 655 
 Socio-economics 
Gender 0.248 0.255 0.0115 0.0071 0.785 500 639 
Age 48.54 51.64 0.1376 3.0960*** 0.001 500 639 
Education (years) 7.16 8.26 0.1699 1.1070*** 0.0001 500 639 
Household size 3.25 3.34 0.0343 0.0887 0.416 500 639 
Adult equivalent units 2.38 2.42 0.0268 0.0422 0.525 500 655 
Household income (COP/month) 518908 468111 -0.0825 -50797** 0.055 500 639 
Owned house 0.486 0.571 0.1202 0.0852*** 0.004 500 639 
Rented house 0.412 0.351 -0.0892 -0.0615** 0.034 500 639 
Family house 0.102 0.080 -0.0545 -0.0222 0.193 500 639 
 Dwelling 
House size (m2) 45.61 62.43 0.2961 16.82*** 0.000 500 639 
No. rooms 6.73 7.46 0.2400 0.7357*** 0.000 500 639 
Terrace 0.08 0.04 -0.1166 -0.0389*** 0.005 500 639 
Garden 0.23 0.19 -0.0611 -0.0355 0.145 500 639 
House (several floors) 0.17 0.18 0.0061 0.0033 0.885 500 639 
House (one floor) 0.77 0.75 -0.0355 -0.0215 0.402 500 639 
Apartment (building) 0.01 0.01 -0.0303 -0.0046 0.468 500 639 
Apartment (interior) 0.04 0.03 -0.0471 -0.0127 0.259 500 639 
House age 27.89 28.43 0.0252 0.5483 0.552 500 639 
No. years in dwelling 14.69 14.13 -0.0257 -0.5604 0.543 500 639 
No. months in dwelling (per year) 11.86 11.32 -0.2038 -0.5423*** 0.000 500 639 
 Water infrastructure 
Dual flush toilets 0.15 0.12 -0.0490 -0.0271 0.246 500 639 
Water-saving showerheads 0.12 0.10 -0.0472 -0.0238 0.265 500 639 
Water-saving sink and dishwasher 0.09 0.08 -0.0197 -0.0093 0.645 500 639 
Water-saving washing machine 0.15 0.08 -0.1587 -0.0709*** 0.0001 500 639 
Water storage tank 0.07 0.54 0.6106 0.4643*** 0.000 500 639 
 Knowledge 
Average water bill (COP/month) 13121 22313 0.5544 9192*** 0.000 500 634 
Expensive water will 4.50 4.14 -0.0134 -0.3668 0.750 500 634 
Keep track water consumption 4.00 3.95 -0.0244 -0.0512 0.563 500 634 
 Social capital and Networks 
Time in county (years) 25.78 23.62 -0.1567 -2.1590*** 0.0002 500 633 
No. organizations 0.81 1.00 0.0982 0.1880** 0.022 500 630 
Source: Own elaboration. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure A3. Average water consumption in April 2012 vs. April 2013 in Jericó 
(top) and extract of a newspaper (bottom) 
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